Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission: Should the FCC Revive Cable Television\u27s Must Carry Requirement by Greene, Alison K.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
6-1-1986
Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission: Should the FCC Revive Cable
Television's Must Carry Requirement
Alison K. Greene
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alison K. Greene, Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission: Should the FCC Revive Cable Television's Must Carry
Requirement, 19 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1369 (1986).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol19/iss4/11
QUINCY CABLE TV, INC. v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION: SHOULD THE FCC REVIVE
CABLE TELEVISION'S MUST CARRY
REQUIREMENT?
I. INMRODUCTION
In its infancy, cable television service was designed to transmit clear
broadcast signals to viewers in rural areas. In the past three decades,
cable has evolved into a full scale communications medium, offering
viewers a wide variety of information and entertainment services.
Throughout most of cable television's history, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC or Commission) has attempted to ensure,
through regulation of cable signal carriage, that the growth of cable tele-
vision does not adversely affect the development of traditional broadcast
television service.' Prior to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
decision in Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion,2 FCC regulations required that cable television systems carry the
signals of all the local broadcast stations in the community served by the
system as part of its basic service. This "must carry" requirement was
designed to guarantee that cable subscribers still had ready access to lo-
cal broadcast stations, and that no local station would be placed at a
competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other stations or services carried on
the community's system.3
After considering challenges to the constitutionality of the genera-
tion-old must carry rules, the Quincy court determined that the rules
impermissibly infringed upon the first amendment freedoms of cable sys-
tem operators and cable television programmers.4 The court found that
by imposing mandatory carriage of local broadcast signals on cable sys-
tems, the rules abridged cable operators' editorial discretion and re-
stricted cable programmers' opportunities to sell their services.5
1. The FCC has the authority to regulate radio and television broadcasting as required by
the "public convenience, interest, or necessity." Communications Act of 1934, § 303, 47
U.S.C. § 303 (1982). The Commission also has the authority to regulate cable television as
long as the regulation is in the public interest and reasonably ancillary to its regulation of
broadcast television. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
FCC's jurisdiction over cable television.
2. 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
3. See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
4. 768 F.2d at 1438.
5. See infra notes 108-13 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of the Quincy
court's holding.
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As background to the Quincy decision, this Note provides a brief
history of the regulations adopted by the FCC in the early 1960's to en-
sure the continued financial vitality of conventional broadcast television
in the face of competition from cable. Next, this Note presents the
Quincy case and analyzes the court's reasons for invalidating the "must
carry" rules. Following the case analysis, this Note discusses the subse-
quent actions taken by broadcasters in response to the Quincy decision.
This Note assumes that when the Quincy court invalidated the must
carry rules, it established a minimum standard of constitutionality for
regulations that incidentally impinge upon cablecasters' first amendment
freedoms. It is not the purpose of this Note to establish the ideal stan-
dard of constitutional analysis for cable television regulations. Instead,
this Note analyzes the constitutionality and practicality of future
mandatory carriage regulations in light of the Quincy standard. After
discussing several proposals for new must carry rules filed with the FCC
by competing broadcast interest groups, this Note recommends that the
Commission adopt rules which provide that cable operators be required
to carry only the public broadcast stations in their local communities.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Must Carry Rules
Prior to their judicial demise,6 the must carry rules required that a
cable system carry, upon the stations' request, the signals of all commer-
cial television stations within thirty-five miles of the community served
by the system, qualified public or noncommercial educational broadcast
stations in the same market, and all other stations "significantly viewed" 7
in the community.' The applicability of the rules depended upon the size
of the television market in which the system was located.9 The rules
made no exceptions for cable systems with limited channel capacities, a
6. The must carry rules became ineffective September 3, 1985, after the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied the National Association of
Broadcasters and other broadcast interest groups' petition for a stay of execution. NAB,
Broadcasters Ask for Stay of Execution of Must Carry, BROADCASTING, Aug. 26, 1985, at 31.
7. "Significantly viewed" signals were defined in 47 C.F.R. § 76.54(a) (1984) as those
listed in Appendix B of the FCC's Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration of
the Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 326, 378-463 (1972).
8. See generally 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57-.61 (1984).
9. The FCC defined the terms "major" and "smaller" television markets for purposes of
cable television regulation, then provided separate must carry provisions for those systems
operating in communities located outside of all major and smaller television markets, 47
C.F.R. § 76.57 (1984), for those systems operating within smaller television markets, id.
§ 76.59, and for those systems located within major television markets, id. § 76.61.
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large number of must carry obligations or a great deal of programming
duplication. Although the rules contained a waiver provision,1" the
Commission was not generous in granting waivers to system operators
who petitioned for relief from their must carry obligations.11
B. Historical Development
The first cable television systems were known as Community An-
tenna Television (CATV) systems. These systems developed in the late
1940's and early 1950's to amplify and distribute television signals of
good quality to areas where reception was difficult or non-existent.12 Re-
ception is bolstered in weak signal areas by the installation of a common
antenna at a prime location near the community such as atop a high
tower or mountain. The antenna picks up steady signals from distant
television broadcast stations, transmits them to a receiving station by
wire or microwave, and ultimately distributes them by cable to the re-
ceiving sets of system subscribers.
1 3
Initially, CATV systems did not produce any original programming;
they merely provided subscribers with clear reception of both local and
distant television signals.1 4 Although the CATV industry originated to
provide clear reception to sparsely settled areas and areas of adverse ter-
rain, in recent years cable systems have become increasingly popular
even in areas where broadcast reception is uninterrupted." Today, cable
10. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.7 (1984).
11. Absent a compelling showing, the FCC would not grant must carry waivers even if the
mandatory carriage obligations resulted in deletion of discretionary signals. In re Amendment
of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Sections 76.59-76.63) with Respect to
"Saturated" Cable Television Systems, 66 F.C.C.2d 710, 713 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Satu-
rated Cable Television Systems]. For examples of cases where the Commission denied peti-
tions for waiver, see In re MBS Cable TV, Inc., 59 F.C.C.2d 1181 (1976); In re Liberty TV
Cable, Inc., 53 F.C.C.2d 275 (1975); In re Concord TV Cable, 58 F.C.C.2d 1178 (1975); In re
TelePrompter Cable Communications Corp., 47 F.C.C.2d 1222 (1974). Although the problem
was not resolved, the FCC took notice of the plight of saturated cable systems and issued a
notice of proposed rulemaking in 1977. Saturated Cable Television Systems, supra, at 710.
12. Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. FCC, 225 F.2d 511, 517 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (holding
that FCC erroneously denied protest against grant of permit to operate television station).
13. Id.
14. Distant television broadcast signals are those signals coming from more than 35 miles
away from a cable system located in a large television market, and more than 55 miles away
from a cable system located in a smaller market. D. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAw 474 (2d ed.
1981).
15. The launching of domestic communications satellites in the mid-1970's gave cable sys-
tems the opportunity to import distant television signals to subscribers. This added attraction
made cable popular in urban as well as rural areas. For a brief discussion on this point, see
Lloyd, Cable Television's Emerging Two-Way Services: A Dilemma for Federal and State Reg-
ulators, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (1983).
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television delivers not only broadcast signals, but also an entire menu of
national program services distributed to cable systems via satellite.16
In 1958, the FCC expressly disclaimed any jurisdiction over CATV
systems, and made no attempt to regulate the industry.17 In 1962, how-
ever, the Commission shifted its position. In In re Carter Mountain
Transmission Corp.,8 the Commission asserted indirect jurisdiction over
cable by imposing restrictions upon the activities of the common carrier
microwave facilities which serve CATV systems.
In Carter Mountain, the Commission denied the application of a mi-
crowave carrier who sought permission to construct facilities for the
transmission of distant television signals to three local CATV systems. 19
The Commission concluded that it would not serve the public interest,
convenience or necessity to grant the microwave carrier's application,
believing that importation of distant signals on the CATV systems would
lead to the "demise" of the local television station and loss of service to
16. Home Box Office, Inc. provided the first cable programming service via satellite in
1975, when it began offering motion pictures for an additional fee. G. SHAPIRO, P. KURLAND
& J. MERCURIO, CABLESPEECH: THE CASE FOR FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION 2 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as CABLESPEECH]. Today there are approximately 40 video program serv-
ices and a number of non-video services distributed to cable systems over the facilities of three
domestic satellites. The wide variety of programming available includes live and taped sports
events, religious programs, motion pictures, music videos, childrens' programs, foreign lan-
guage programming, national and international news and other cultural, informational and
entertainment programs. Id.
17. Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958), recon. denied, In re In-
quiry Into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV Translators, TV "Satellite" Sta-
tions, and TV "Repeaters" on the Orderly Development of Television Broadcasting, 26 F.C.C.
403 (1959) [hereinafter cited as CATV Report & Order]. In Frontier Broadcasting Co., the
Commission held that it did not have jurisdiction over CATV under the provisions of the
Communications Act relating to common carriers. CATV Report & Order, supra, at 427. It
should be noted, however, that while finding "no present basis for asserting jurisdiction or
authority over CATV's," id. at 431, the FCC recognized that CATV may have an adverse
impact upon the development of broadcasting. The FCC concluded its CATV Report and
Order as follows:
Two of the broadcasters' suggestions, both relating to CATV's, we adopt. These are
that CATV systems should be required to obtain the consent of the stations whose
signals they transmit and that they should be required to carry the signal of the local
station (without degrading it) if the local station so requests. Since both of these
steps require changes in the Communications Act, we will shortly recommend to
Congress appropriate legislation ....
Id. at 441.
18. 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962), af'd, Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d
359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
19. Id. at 465. In CATV systems, microwave facilities are used to relay the television
broadcast signals, normally picked up off the air at a point some distance from the transmitting
broadcast antenna, through a series of radio repeaters to a point in or near the community
served by the system. The television signals are then distributed by cable to the individual
subscribers' sets.
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those persons who chose not to pay the cost of subscribing to a CATV
system.2" The Commission reasoned that the need for a local television
outlet outweighed the benefit of the improved service which CATV sys-
tems could promise its subscribers.21 The Commission agreed, however,
to grant the application if the CATV system operators agreed to carry
the signal of the local broadcast station and not to duplicate the pro-
gramming of the local station on any other channels on their systems.22
In appealing the FCC's decision to the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals, the microwave carrier contended that by denying the
application the Commission had attempted to regulate CATV systems
without the legal authority to do so.23 The court disagreed and held that
the Commission had "justifiably concluded that the continuance of the
local station served the public interest, and that [the FCC] was fully war-
ranted in imposing conditions, designed to protect that station, for the
reconsideration of appellant's application."'24
In 1965, the FCC decided that "the likelihood or probability of
[CATV's] adverse impact upon potential and existing [broadcast] service
[had] become too substantial to be dismissed. '25 Thus, the Commission
expanded its holding in Carter Mountain and imposed general regulation
on all microwave-fed cable systems' carriage of broadcast signals.2 6 The
FCC noted that although cable systems and local broadcasters provide
the public with the same basic product-programs created or sold for
distribution-the local broadcast stations must bargain and bid for their
programming in the program distribution market, subject to that mar-
ket's various restrictions and conditions. 27 Unlike broadcasters, cable
systems do not come within the scope of section 325 of the Communica-
tions Act,28 and could rebroadcast distant broadcast signals without en-
tering the program distribution market and without encountering any
20. Carter Mountain, 32 F.C.C. at 464-65.
21. Id. at 465.
22. Id.
23. Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359, 363 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
24. Id. at 366.
25. Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, First Report & Order, 38 F.C.C. 683, 713-14
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Mircowave-Served CATV Report].
26. Id. at 713-15.
27. Id. at 704.
28. Communications Act of 1934, § 325(a), 47 U.S.C. § 325(a) (1982). Section 325(a) of
the Communications Act prohibits "any broadcasting station [from] rebroadcast[ing] the pro-
gram or any part thereof of another broadcasting station without the express authority of the
originating station." Id. In its CATV Report & Order, the FCC determined that CATV
retransmission of broadcast signals was not "rebroadcasting" within the scope of § 325.
CATV Report & Order, supra note 17, at 429-30.
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regulation or copyright liability.2 9
The FCC reasoned that the importation of distant signals into the
service areas of local stations necessarily created substantial competition
for local broadcasting.30 Consequently, the Commission concluded that
mandatory carriage and nonduplication rules31 were necessary to create
"reasonably fair and open conditions for competition between CATV
and broadcasting stations,"32 and also to "ameliorate the adverse impact
of CATV competition upon local stations, existing and potential.""3
The FCC assumed that CATV service was intended to supplement,
not replace, over-the-air broadcast service.34 Therefore, the failure or re-
fusal of a CATV system to carry the signal of a local station was plainly
inconsistent with that assumption and was "inherently contrary to the
public interest."35 The Commission realized that it was enacting rules to
prevent a result that was purely speculative, and went on to state: "If the
rules should ultimately prove unnecessary or need modification in light
of the passage of time, congressional action or other factors, they can be
modified or rescinded. Our best present judgment is that the public in-
terest requires their adoption.
'36
The following year, 1966, the FCC extended the applicability of the
must carry rules to all cable systems, not only those which require micro-
29. Microwave-Served CATV Report, supra note 25, at 703-04.
30. Id. at 707.
31. Nonduplication rules, adopted at the same time as the must carry requirement, pre-
clude CATV systems from duplicating the programming of local stations for periods of 15
days before and after a local broadcast. The rules are designed to protect local broadcast
stations' exclusivity, including their right to exhibit programs in the competitive program mar-
ket. See Microwave-Served CATV Report, supra note 25, at 743. See also 47 C.F.R. § 76.92
(1985) for the current nonduplication provisions.
32. Microwave-Served CATV Report, supra note 25, at 713.
33. Id. The FCC stressed that the issue was not whether to bar CATV entry into any
particular market. Rather, the issue was whether to permit the use of microwave facilities to
serve CATV systems while imposing some restrictions upon the manner in which CATV sys-
tems competed with the local television stations. Id. at 707. The FCC concluded that there
was sufficient evidence showing that CATV had a competitive advantage over, and an adverse
impact upon, local television to justify some regulation. Id.
The FCC stated that "it is plain that CATV competition can have a substantial negative
effect upon station audience and revenues, although we lack the tools with which to measure
precisely the degree of such impact." Id. at 710-11. The FCC speculated that the competition
from cable could destroy or prevent the establishment of stations and could also "impair the
ability of stations fully to serve the needs and interests of their communities." Id. at 707.
34. Id. at 705.
35. Id. The FCC also stated that a CATV system's failure to carry a local station placed
an unreasonable restriction upon that station's ability to compete in the market, and that it was
patently destructive of the goals of the FCC in seeking to allocate television channels to differ-
ent areas and communities. Id.
36. Id. at 715.
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wave licenses but also those which receive their signals off the air.37 The
rules were updated in 197238 and remained virtually unchanged until
they were ruled unconstitutional in Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC.39
C. Judicial Challenges to Cable Regulation
In United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,' the United States
Supreme Court upheld the FCC's authority to regulate cable television as
long as the regulation was "reasonably ancillary to the effective perform-
ance of [its] responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcast-
ing.'"4 1 Since the 1968 Southwestern Cable decision, the Court has heard
several cases challenging the breadth of the FCC's authority over cable,
and has passed judgment on the types of regulations that come within the
"reasonably ancillary" limitation.42 However, the Supreme Court has
yet to determine the constitutional validity of any cable regulation.
Assuming that the regulation was arguably within the FCC's juris-
diction, cable system operators then challenged the constitutionality of
cable regulations, including the must carry rules, in the lower courts. In
Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC,4 3 the Eighth Circuit rejected a cable
operator's claim that the must carry rules violated his first amendment
37. CATV, Second Report & Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 745 (1966).
38. Cable Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, reconsidered, 36 F.C.C.2d 326
(1972), affid, ACLU v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975).
39. 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
40. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
41. Id. at 178. In Southwestern Cable, respondent claimed the FCC had no authority to
issue a rule banning CATV transmission of distant signals into the 100 largest television mar-
kets unless the service existed prior to the time the rule was issued or unless the Commission
found the service to be" 'consistent with the public interest.'" Id. at 180 (quoting In re Mid-
west Television, Inc., 4 F.C.C.2d 612, 626 (1966)). The Supreme Court did not rule on the
validity of the specific rule promulgated. Rather, the Court only determined whether the FCC
had the authority under the Federal Communications Act to regulate CATV systems and, if
so, whether it had the authority to issue the prohibitory rule being challenged. Id. at 167.
The Court held that the Commission had broad authority over "'all interstate or foreign
communication by wire or radio'" under the Act, and that CATV systems were included
within this interstate communication. Id. at 167-68 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1968)). The
Court also found that the FCC had reasonably determined that the successful performance of
its responsibilities for the orderly development of local television broadcasting allowed for
some regulation of cable systems, and that the FCC had the authority to issue the prohibitory
order. Id. at 167-81.
42. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984) (Court addressed FCC's
authority to preempt state and local cable regulations); FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S.
689 (1979) (Midwest 11) (rules which required cable operators to make channels available for
local access held invalid and beyond scope of FCC jurisdiction); United States v. Midwest
Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (plurality) (Midwest 1) (rule requiring cable operators to
originate their own local programming held within FCC's grant of authority).
43. 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968).
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rights.' After citing the Supreme Court's decision in National Broad-
casting Co. v. United States, 45 which determined that the right of free
speech does not include the right to use the airwaves without a license,
4 6
the Black Hills Video court held:
The Commission's effort to preserve local television by
regulating CATVs has the same constitutional status under the
First Amendment as regulation of the transmission of signals
by the originating television stations. It is irrelevant to the
Congressional power that the CATV systems do not themselves
use the airwaves in their distribution systems. The crucial con-
sideration is that they do use radio signals and that they have a
unique impact upon, and relationship with, the television
broadcast service.47
At the time Black Hills Video was decided, cable television service
was assumed to be secondary to broadcasting and virtually dependent
upon broadcast signals for its programming.48 In fact, for nearly a dec-
ade following that decision, the courts did not question the propriety of
treating cable television regulation as indistinguishable from broadcast
regulation for purposes of first amendment analysis.49 It was not until
the landmark decision in Home Box Office v. FCC 0 that the courts be-
44. Id. at 69.
45. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
46. Id. at 227. In National Broadcasting Co., the appellants challenged FCC regulations
relating to the licensing of radio broadcast stations. Id. at 209. In this landmark decision, the
Court held that the regulatory powers of the Commission were not limited to the engineering
and technical aspects of radio communications, and that the FCC had the authority to adopt,
in the "public interest," regulations that restricted which broadcast stations were granted oper-
ating licenses. Id. at 216-18.
The Court also rejected the appellants' claim that the licensing restrictions abridged their
right to free speech. Id. at 227. The Court recognized that due to the physical limitations of
the electromagnetic spectrum, radio could not possibly be available to all. Id. at 226. For this
reason, broadcasting, unlike other forms of expression, was subject to governmental control.
Id. at 227. The Court stated:
The right of free speech does not include, however, the right to use the facilities of
radio without a license. The licensing system established by Congress in the Com-
munications Act of 1934 was a proper exercise of its power over commerce. The
standard it provided for the licensing of stations was the "public interest, conven-
ience, or necessity." Denial of a station license on that ground, if valid under the
Act, is not a denial of free speech.
Id.
47. Black Hills Video, 399 F.2d at 69.
48. See CABLESPEECH, supra note 16, at 139-41.
49. See, e.g., Southwest Pa. Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 514 F.2d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(cable's nonduplication regulations upheld); Midwest Television, Inc. v. FCC, 426 F.2d 1222,
1230 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (FCC order restricting expansion of CATV system to promote success
of UHF stations in same area upheld).
50. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
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gan to reevaluate cable television's role in the telecommunications
industry. 1
In Home Box Office, the court ruled on the validity of an FCC regu-
lation limiting the number and type of feature films and sports events
that cable television systems and pay subscription broadcast stations52
could offer their subscribers.13 The cable and pay broadcast system oper-
ators claimed that such a regulation exceeded the FCC's authority. 4
The FCC contended that the rule was necessary to prevent cable and pay
television system operators from bidding away or siphoning off the better
programs from conventional broadcast television. 5  By limiting the cable
and pay television systems to material which would not otherwise be
shown on television, the FCC hoped to avoid such siphoning and to en-
hance the diversity of program offerings on broadcast television as a
whole. 6 With regard to cable television,57 the court held that the FCC
did not have jurisdiction to promulgate the challenged regulation, and
therefore held the regulation invalid. 8 In order to avoid multiple re-
mands, the court also determined the proper standard of first amendment
analysis for cable television in the event that the FCC was able to satisfy
the jurisdictional prerequisites.5 9
The court ruled that the first amendment standard of analysis devel-
oped in National Broadcasting Co. 60 and reaffirmed in Red Lion Broad-
5 1. See supra note 16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the prominent role Home
Box Office, Inc. played in the evolution of the cable television industry.
52. Subscription television stations possess the technical capability to broadcast programs
in a "scrambled" manner. Scrambling permits only those members of the public who have
paid a fee to receive special equipment to unscramble the signal and receive it in intelligible
form. See National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194, 195 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970). See also 47 C.F.R. § 73.641(b) (1985) for a codified defini-
tion of subscription stations.
53. Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 21.
54. Id. at 18.
55. Id. at 21.
56. Id.
57. The court stated that cable regulations must be considered separately from those regu-
lations applicable to subscription broadcast television, and it upheld the regulation insofar as it
related to subscription broadcast television. Id. at 18.
58. Id. The court determined that the proper test for FCC jurisdiction over cable television
was whether the ends proposed to be achieved by the regulation were also well understood and
consistently held ends for which broadcast television could be regulated. Id. at 28. Under this
standard, the challenged rule did not pass muster. Id. at 34.
59. Id.
60. 319 U.S. 190 (1943). The first amendment tolerates a far more intrusive regulation of
broadcasting than other forms of expression due to the physical limitations of the airwaves.
Only a certain number of voices or images can simultaneously be carried over the electromag-
netic spectrum. Id. at 226.
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casting Co. v. FCC,6 1 which allows for some degree of governmental
regulation of the broadcast industry, could not be directly applied to
cable television. The court reasoned that "since an essential precondition
of that theory-physical interference and scarcity requiring an umpiring
role for government-is absent,",62 cable television was distinguishable
from broadcast television. The court made it clear, however, that the
absence in cable television of the physical limitations of the electromag-
netic spectrum 63 did not automatically lead to the conclusion that no
regulation of cable would be acceptable vis-a-vis the first amendment.'
The Home Box Office court emphasized that the right of free speech does
not embrace the right to suppress the speech of others, and therefore
determined that the "government may adopt reasonable regulations sepa-
rating broadcasters competing and interfering with each other for the
same audience."6
The Home Box Office court noted the distinction between govern-
mental regulations which are intended to "curtail expression" and those
evincing a "'governmental interest... unrelated to the suppression of
free speech.' "66 Regulations that fall into the latter category will be
upheld if they pass muster under the criteria set forth in United States v.
61. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). In Red Lion, a broadcaster contended that certain FCC regula-
tions relating to broadcast presentation of controversial issues of public concern abridged his
first amendment freedom. Id. at 386. The regulations provided that if statements made over
the air amounted to an attack on the integrity of an individual or group, the broadcaster was
required to notify the person or group attacked and provide reasonable opportunity for re-
sponse over the broadcaster's facilities. Id. at 373-75. The Court held that the FCC's rules,
intended to promote fairness, did not exceed the FCC's authority, and stated that "[ijn view of
the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the Government's role in allocating those frequencies,
and the legitimate claims of those unable without governmental assistance to gain access to
those frequencies for expression of their views, we hold the regulations.., are both authorized
by statute and constitutional." Id. at 400-01 (footnote omitted).
62. Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 45. In the National Broadcasting Co. and Red Lion
cases, the Court observed that placing restrictions on broadcasters actually furthered, rather
than impeded, first amendment goals. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority in National
Broadcasting Co., stated, "[w]ith everybody on the air, nobody could be heard." 319 U.S. at
212.
63. For an explanation of the limitations of the electromagnetic spectrum, see supra note
46. In contrast to the limited airwaves, improvements in the technology of cable television
have increased the channel capacity of cable systems within the last 20 years. CABLESPEECH,
supra note 16, at 2. By installing dual cables, modern cable systems can be built to accommo-
date more than 200 channels of programming. Id.
64. Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 46. This statement indicates the court's unwillingness to
analogize cable television to the conventional press and adopt the standard of first amendment
protection set forth in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). See
infra note 149 and accompanying text for further discussion of this standard.
65. 567 F.2d at 47.
66. Id. at 47-48 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
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O'Brien.6 7 On the other hand, rules that fall into the former category
will be upheld, if at all, only if the government can meet a significantly
heavier burden of proof and show a compelling interest justifying such a
law. 68
Because the challenged FCC regulation was not intended to sup-
press speech, but instead to protect the quality of free television program-
ming, the court held that the proper standard of analysis for the
regulation was the balancing test set out in O'Brien.69 Under the O'Brien
test, a government regulation will be upheld if: (1) It is within the consti-
tutional power of the government; (2) it furthers an important or sub-
stantial government interest; (3) the interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and (4) the incidental burden on first
amendment freedom of speech is no greater than is necessary to further
the government interest.7 0 In applying the O'Brien criteria to the regula-
tion at issue, the Home Box Office court found that although it was
within the FCC's constitutional power and "speech neutral," the regula-
tion was still impermissible because it could not satisfy the test's remain-
ing two requirements. According to the court, the challenged rule served
no substantial government interest and was "grossly overbroad.
' '71
In addition, the Home Box Office court added another dimension to
the O'Brien standard: it required that the Commission state the harm
which its regulation sought to remedy and its reasons for supposing that
the potential for harm existed.7" The court stated that requiring the reg-
ulation to serve a substantial government interest "translates in the
67. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In O'Brien, respondent O'Brien publicly burned his Selective
Service registration certificate in order to convince others to adopt his anti-war beliefs. Id. at
369. He was convicted of violating a recently amended provision of the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, which made it a crime for anyone to knowingly destroy or mutilate
draft certificates. Id. at 369-70.
O'Brien contended that the amendment was unconstitutional because it was enacted to
abridge speech and served no legitimate legislative purpose. Id. at 370. He claimed that the
first amendment protects all modes of communication of ideas, and his act of burning his draft
card, done in demonstration against the war and draft, constituted speech within the context of
the first amendment protection. Id. at 376. The Court first rejected O'Brien's argument that
his act constituted speech protected by the Constitution. The Court then stated that when
speech and non-speech elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important governmental interest can justify incidental burdens on first amendment freedoms.
Id. The Court held that the challenged provision served a substantial government interest-
maintenance of an efficient and easily administered system for raising armies-and that it was
narrowly and precisely drawn to specifically protect this stated interest. Id. at 381-82.
68. Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 47-48.
69. Id. at 48.
70. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
71. Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 49-51.
72. Id. at 34.
June 1986] 1379
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:1369
rulemaking context into a record that convincingly shows a problem to
exist and that relates the proffered solution to the statutory mandate of
the agency."" In essence, the court placed the burden on the Commis-
sion to show first that the siphoning phenomenon was an actual threat to
broadcast television and second that the promulgated regulation was suf-
ficiently tailored to cure the siphoning problem.
The court held that there was no evidence in the FCC's record sup-
porting the need for the regulation and, therefore, even if the FCC had
the authority to promulgate the rule, it was invalid.7 4 The court stated
that "'a regulation perfectly reasonable and appropriate in the face of a
given problem is highly capricious if that problem does not exist.' ","1
Thus, the Home Box Office court, in determining a possible standard by
which to analyze the constitutionality of cable television regulations, es-
tablished guidelines for attacking the validity of the must carry rules.
III. QUINCY CABLE TV, INc v. FCC
A. The Facts
In Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia consolidated two petitions challenging the Commis-
sion's must carry rules, the first by Turner Broadcasting System (TBS)
and the second by Quincy Cable TV.76 In 1980, TBS filed a petition with
the FCC requesting that the Commission institute rulemaking proce-
dures to delete the must carry rules. 7 TBS contended that the regula-
tory environment had changed so that rules requiring mandatory
carriage of broadcast signals were no longer necessary.78 TBS also ar-
gued that under the first amendment test set out for cable television regu-
lations in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,7 9 the rules could not pass
constitutional scrutiny.8°
TBS, the licensee of "Superstation" WTBS, an Atlanta broadcast
station which is distributed throughout the country via satellite retrans-
mission, also originates two nonbroadcast program services which are
73. Id. at 50.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 36 (quoting City of Chicago v. Federal Power Comm'n, 458 F.2d 731, 742 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972)).
76. 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The three judge panel consisted of Circuit Judges
Wright (who filed the opinion for the court), Bork and Ginsburg. Id. at 1437-38.
77. Id. at 1445.
78. Id.
79. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); see supra notes
52-75 and accompanying text.
80. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1445.
1380
MUST CARR Y RULES
distributed primarily through cable systems."1 TBS claimed that when
the must carry rules cause a significant amount of a cable system's chan-
nel space to be occupied with signals of local broadcast stations, it artifi-
cially increases the competition cable programmers 2 face for the limited
amount of channel space left on the systems.83 In some instances, TBS
contended, cable systems became so saturated with must carry obliga-
tions that the rules operated to preclude the programmers from any op-
portunity to sell their services to these systems.84 Initially, the FCC
failed to respond to TBS's petition. Then, in April 1984, the Commis-
sion issued a brief order denying TBS's challenge of the must carry
rules.8 6 TBS then sought judicial review of the Commission's denial.87
Petitioner Quincy Cable TV operates a cable television system in
Quincy, Washington, a small town located approximately halfway be-
tween Seattle and Spokane. At the time Quincy petitioned the Commis-
sion for a partial waiver of its must carry obligations, it had only a twelve
channel capacity. 8  Quincy contended that its must carry obligations
precluded carriage of three other program services which would proba-
bly be more popular among the system's subscribers than the Spokane
stations it was required to carry.89 The FCC denied Quincy's petition,
ordered it to carry the signals of the local Spokane stations, and imposed
a $5000 forfeiture for its failure to do so.90 Quincy sought judicial review
of the Commission's order.9" After considering the parties' petitions, the
three judge panel held that the FCC's must carry rules, as presently writ-
ten, violated petitioners' first amendment rights and were therefore
81. Id. at 1437 n.3.
82. A cable television programmer is an independent service which provides cable system
operators with programming to transmit over their systems. Id. at 1437 n.1.
83. Id. at 1445.
84. Id. See infra note 160 for a discussion of saturated cable systems.
85. Id. at 1446. In March of 1983, TBS filed a second petition, again seeking reevaluation
of the must carry rules. When that petition elicited no response from the Commission, TBS
sought review in court. The Commission then successfully moved to remand the record so
that it could act upon TBS' petition. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. TBS sought review pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1982), which grants parties the
right to appeal decisions and orders of the FCC exclusively to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia.
88. Id. at 1446; see infra note 91.
89. Id. at 1446-47.
90. rd. at 1447.
91. Id. Shortly before the date set for oral argument the court learned that Quincy Cable
had substantially increased its channel capacity. Id. at 1447 n.28. The court remanded the
case to the FCC for reconsideration in light of the changed circumstances. Id. at 1447. On
remand, the Commission reaffirmed its earlier decision, and Quincy again went forward with a
petition for judicial review. Id.
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unconstitutional.92
B. The Court's Reasoning
In determining the validity of the must carry rules, the Quincy court
closely examined the nature of cable television technology, the origin and
purposes of the FCC's regulation of that technology, and the prior judi-
cial assessments of the constitutionality of the FCC's regulation.93 In
order to determine the appropriate standard of first amendment review
for the must carry rules, Judge Wright posed two "distinct questions":
(1) Whether cable television regulation warrants a standard of review
different from that of broadcast television; and (2) if so, whether the must
carry regulations merit treatment as "incidental" burdens on speech and
therefore warrant review under the balancing test developed in United
States v. O'Brien.94
In addressing the first question, the court stated that "sensitivity to
the uniqueness of each medium" precluded its "facile adoption" of first
amendment jurisprudence that has developed around challenges to FCC
regulation of radio and broadcast television.9" The Quincy court, like
others in recent decisions,96 recognized the problem inherent in assuming
that cable television regulations should be treated the same as broadcast
television regulations for purposes of first amendment scrutiny.97 Ac-
cording to Judge Wright, the scarcity rationale, which has provided the
justification for governmental regulation of broadcasting, "has no place
in evaluating government regulation of cable television" 98 since cable tel-
evision technology allows for "virtually unlimited channel capacity." 99
The court also discussed, but disregarded, the other attributes of
cable television which could arguably justify application of the first
amendment standard reserved for broadcasters: "We cannot agree...
that the mere fact that cable operators require the use of a public right of
way-typically utility poles-somehow justifies lesser First Amendment
92. Id. at 1438.
93. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1438-47 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
94. Id. at 1447-48 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 319 U.S. 367 (1968)). See supra text
accompanying note 70 for a discussion of the O'Brien test.
95. Id. at 1448.
96. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 45-46 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); see also Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1406 (9th Cir.) (City's process of awarding cable franchises by auc-
tion, thus limiting access to one cable company per region, violated first amendment), cert.
granted, 106 S. Ct. 380 (1985).
97. 768 F.2d at 1448-50.
98. Id. at 1449.
99. Id. at 1450.
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scrutiny."'" The court recognized that there must be some governmen-
tal regulation regarding the installation and maintenance of cable sys-
tems, but it stated that these regulations need not extend so far as to
control the nature of programming that is conveyed over the system.101
Additionally, the court refused to accept the argument that the
"natural monopoly characteristics" of cable franchising create economic
constraints comparable to the physical constraints imposed upon broad-
casters. 102 The economic scarcity argument was not analogous, accord-
ing to Judge Wright, because purely economic restraints upon the
number of speakers available on a community cable system do not justify
intrusion into first amendment rights.1 "3 On this point, the court found
no meaningful distinction between the economic monopolistic character-
istics of cable television and those of newspapers."
After deciding that cable television definitely requires a different
standard of first amendment review than that used for broadcasting regu-
lations, the court addressed its second question-the appropriateness of
treating the must carry rules as merely incidental burdens on speech.
10 5
Although the court conceded that the must carry rules may be content
neutral, 10 6 it stated that the assumption that the rules only incidentally
burden speech may be erroneous. 07 The court explained that
"[a]lthough not intended to suppress or protect any particular viewpoint,
the rules are explicitly designed to 'favor[ ] certain classes of speakers
100. Id. at 1449.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1449-50.
103. Id. at 1450 (citing Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 247-56
(1974)).
104. Id. (citing Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9,46 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cerL
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977)). The Quincy court disposed of this argument by analogizing to
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1450. In
Miami Herald, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state statute granting political can-
didates a right to equal space to reply to criticism or attacks upon their records by the newspa-
per. 418 U.S. at 258. The Court reasoned that the law failed to clear the first amendment's
barriers because of its intrusion into the newspaper editors' function of choosing what material
to put into their papers. Id.
105. 768 F.2d at 1450.
106. Id. at 1451. "In one sense.., the government can frame the interest served by the
must-carry rules in essentially speech-neutral terms. So framed, the rules' object is to assure
that the rise of a potentially monolithic national television industry does not undermine the
economic vitality of free, locally-controlled broadcasting." Id. (footnote omitted).
107. Id. at 1453. "In short, our examination of the purposes that underlie the must-carry
rules ... leaves us with serious doubts about the propriety of applying the standard of review
reserved for incidental burdens on speech." Id.
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over others.' ,108 The very purpose of the rules, according to the court,
was "to bolster the fortunes of local broadcasters even if the inevitable
consequence of implementing that goal [was] to create an overwhelming
competitive advantage over cable programmers."' 10 9
The court determined that the rules "coerce[d] speech" 110 since they
required that the cable operator carry the local broadcast signals "re-
gardless of their content and irrespective of whether the operator consid-
ers them appropriate.""' The court decided that the rules put
substantial limits on a cable operator's "otherwise broad discretion to
select the programming it offers its subscribers.""' 2
In summarizing its opinion on this point, the Quincy court stated:
We need not, however, definitely decide whether a more exact-
ing standard than that announced in O'Brien and applied in
Home Box Office is the correct test for evaluating the constitu-
tionality of the must-carry rules. For even if we assume that
the regulations burden speech only incidentally and therefore
can pass muster under the First Amendment if they "further[ ]
an important or substantial governmental interest" and impose
a restriction "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest,".., we have concluded that the must-carry regu-
lations, as written, are clearly impermissible. "'
In applying the O'Brien standard, the court also focused upon the
additional requirement set forth in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,1 14 that
"the agency must do something more than merely posit the existence of
the disease sought to be cured.""' 5 The court imposed a heavy burden of
justification upon the FCC, requiring that it show that the must carry
rules were still necessary to preserve localism in broadcasting and to pro-
tect local broadcasters from financial ruin.
116
The court reasoned that "an asserted interest in alleviating or fore-
stalling a problem-such as the destruction of free, local television-can
hardly be considered 'important or substantial' if the government now
108. Id. at 1451 (quoting Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 48 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977)).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1452.
111. Id.
112. Id. (citing Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), which recog-
nized first amendment protection of editorial discretion).
113. Id. at 1454 (citations omitted).
114. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
115. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1455.
116. Id.
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denies that the alleged problem is a problem at all."" 7 The court found
that there may be no "problem" because in recent years the Commission
has eliminated other cable regulations which, like the must carry rules,
were premised on the desire to protect local broadcasters from competi-
tive injury by cable television.' 18 The court relied upon the FCC's con-
clusion in its 1979 Inquiry into the Economic Relationship Between
Television Broadcasting and Cable Television (Economic Inquiry Re-
port)1' 9 that distant signal regulations12 ° were no longer necessary be-
cause "'competition from cable television does not pose a significant
threat to conventional television or to our overall broadcasting
policies.' ,121
According to the court, the FCC's conclusions, "if given the broad
applicability their sweeping tone suggests, would fatally undercut the
Commission's argument that the must-carry rules serve the important
end of preventing the destruction of free, local broadcasting."' 22 The
court concluded that the rules did not serve a substantial government
interest because the FCC had failed to sustain its "heavy burden of justi-
fication" and show that the rules were necessary to prevent serious injury
to local broadcasting.' 23
Finally, the court found that the rules clearly failed to pass muster
under the last requirement of the O'Brien test because the rules were
"grossly" overinclusive with respect to their purpose. 24 The court noted
that the "rules indiscriminately protect each and every broadcaster re-
gardless of the quantity of local service available in the community and
irrespective of the number of local outlets already carried by the cable
117. Id. at 1455-56.
118. Id. at 1456.
119. 71 F.C.C.2d 632 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Economic Inquiry Report].
120. Distant signal regulations, also dependent upon the size of the television market in
which the cable system is located, placed restrictions upon the number of distant signals cable
systems could offer subscribers. Id. at 648-49. As a result of its Economic Inquiry Report,
supra note 119, the Commission determined that these regulations could be removed without
incurring a significant risk of loss of broadcast service to television viewers. Id. at 713-15. In a
later proceeding, which expressly excluded a review of the must carry requirements, the FCC
affirmed its earlier conclusions and eliminated both the distant signal rules and the syndicated
exclusivity rules. The syndicated exclusivity rules required deletion of individual programs
from distant stations that were otherwise available for carriage. CATV Syndicated Program
Exclusivity Rules Report & Order, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 (1980), afl'd, Malrite T.V. v. FCC, 652
F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
121. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1456 (quoting Economic Inquiry Report, supra note 119, at 688).
122. Id. at 1456.
123. Id. at 1459.
124. Id. at 1460 (citing Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 50 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977)).
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operator."' 5 Even local stations that carry little or no actual local pro-
gramming were entitled to carriage under the rules.'2 6 Moreover, the
rules protected every local broadcaster, "regardless of whether or to what
degree the affected cable system poses a threat to its economic well-
being."' 27
The court observed that the FCC's failure to identify which broad-
casters warranted must carry protection made it impossible to conclude
that the rules were effectively tailored to suit their purpose. 28 Although
the court found the must carry rules unconstitutional, it suggested that
the FCC might develop new rules which are "more sensitive to the First
Amendment concerns" that had been discussed in the opinion.' 29
IV. ANALYSIS
In holding that the must carry rules violated the first amendment,
the court in Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC 3 o reached three fundamental
conclusions: (1) Cable television regulation deserves a standard of first
amendment review distinct from that applied to broadcast regulation;13 '
(2) the first amendment analysis for cable regulations discussed in Home
Box Office, Inc. v. FCC'3 2 is an acceptable, but certainly not the best,
method for analyzing the must carry rules;' 33 and, (3) the must carry
rules clearly fail to pass muster under the Home Box Office standard. 134
In determining whether the must carry rules violated first amendment
rights, the Quincy court simply assumed, without discussing, that cable
operators and programmers engage in speech which is worth protect-
ing.'35 The Quincy court began its discussion of the constitutionality of
the must carry rules by stating: "The Supreme Court has repeatedly
stressed that '[e]ach medium of expression.., must be assessed for First
Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its
own problems.' 136 This statement indicates that the court accepted the
fact that cable television is actually a medium of expression, and not
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1461.
128. Id. at 1462.
129. Id. at 1463.
130. 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
131. Id. at 1450.
132. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
133. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1453-54.
134. Id. at 1454-62.
135. Id. at 1452 n.39.
136. Id. at 1438 (quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557
(1975)).
1386
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merely a conduit through which the broadcast signals pass. 137
Although cable systems were originally designed only to distribute
clear television signals to areas where broadcast reception was weak,
their function has rapidly grown and developed over the past thirty
years. Today's cable systems carry not only local broadcast signals but
also distant broadcast signals and national program services transmitted
to cable via satellite.138 Since cable television offers such a wide variety
of services, many scholars argue that cable is actually more analagous to
the press than broadcast television for purposes of the first amend-
ment. 139 Cable programmers, similar to wire news services or syndicated
newspaper columnists, clearly engage in speech since their programs pro-
vide the public with information and entertainment."4 Cable operators,
similar in this respect to newspaper publishers and editors, express them-
selves through the exercise of editorial discretion by selecting which sig-
nals, services and programs to distribute over their systems.' Although
the Quincy court made reference to this comparison, it stopped short of
adopting the analogy.
The Quincy court easily, albeit implicitly, concluded that modem
cable operators and programmers engage in speech and deserve some
protection under the first amendment. The difficult task facing the court
was not only to determine the validity of the must carry rules but, in so
137. In its petition for certiorari, the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) chal-
lenged this assumption. Joint Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v.
FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as NAB Petition for Certiorari]. See
National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 54 U.S.L.W. 3336 (Nov. 12, 1985)
for a synopsis of the NAB's arguments. The NAB argued that with respect to its retransmis-
sion of broadcast signals, cable television is more akin to a conduit than a speaker. NAB
Petition for Certiorari, supra, at 11. The NAB pointed to the copyright law, which grants
cable systems a compulsory license to retransmit local broadcast signals for minimum copy-
right royalties, but forbids cable operators from delaying, deleting or substituting any of the
stations' commercial or program material as it is being distributed to the systems' subscribers.
Id. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(c) (1982) for the provisions of cable television's compulsory copyright
license. With respect to retransmitting broadcast signals, the NAB argued that cable operators
may function only as carriers of expression. What the NAB's argument seems to ignore is the
big picture-that retransmission of local broadcast signals is only one of many services a cable
system performs. Cable operators have full discretion to select which services the system will
carry; by imposing mandatory carriage requirements, the government has abridged the opera-
tors' discretion to select these other services to a certain degree.
138. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
139. See, ag., Goldberg, Ross & Spector, Cable Television, Government Regulation and the
First Amendment, 4 COMM/ENT L.J. 578 (1981).
140. As discussed supra note 16, there are dozens of cable program services appealing to a
wide variety of audiences.
141. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. The United States Supreme Court has
recognized that editorial discretion is deserving of first amendment protection. Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
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doing, to clearly define the scope of cable television's first amendment
protection. The Quincy court, however, invalidated the must carry rules
without actually fulfilling this second task. The court did not develop a
workable, exacting standard for future constitutional analysis of govern-
ment regulation of cable television.
A. Selecting a Standard of First Amendment Review
The Quincy court's first finding, that cable should be distinguished
from broadcast television regulations for purposes of first amendment
analysis, was settled eight years earlier in Home Box Office Inc. v.
FCC.142 In Quincy, Judge Wright merely reviewed and reaffirmed all the
reasons set forth in Home Box Office distinguishing the two media. 143 In
both cases the court recognized that the rationale for allowing a certain
degree of intrusion into a broadcaster's right of free speech is premised
upon the limitations and scarcity of the broadcast medium." Since
cable does not possess similar physical limitations, the scarcity argument
is inappropriate.145 The Quincy court also followed Home Box Office in
rejecting the claim that economic restraints can bring the cable medium
within the scarcity rationale. 146 Although the Quincy court discussed
this issue in great detail, it did nothing more than reaffirm the Home Box
Office holding on this point.
Once the court dismissed the applicability of broadcast television's
first amendment analysis, it had to adopt or develop another standard by
which to measure the must carry rules. 147 Had the Quincy court deter-
mined that the holding of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
148
which established the first amendment standard for the traditional press,
142. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
143. Judge Wright, who wrote the Quincy opinion, was also a member of the panel that
issued the per curiam opinion in Home Box Office.
144. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1448-49 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Home Box
Office, 567 F.2d at 43-45.
145. See supra text accompanying note 99.
146. 768 F.2d at 1448-50; see supra text accompanying notes 100-03.
147. In Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir.),
cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 380 (1985), the court suggested a different approach to the first amend-
ment rights of cable operators:
Undeniably, cable operators do transmit programs produced by others. To the ex-
tent an operator does so, however, we believe it would be treated for First Amend-
ment purposes as would be theater owners, booksellers, and concert promotors (sic].
Their First Amendment protection is not diminished because they distribute or pres-
ent works created by others.
Id. at 1410 n.10.
148. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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also supplied the appropriate standard of analysis for cable television,149
there would have been no need for the court to test the must carry rules
under the United States v. O'Brien '50 standard or to invite the Commis-
sion to adopt new must carry rules."' Under the rule of Miami Herald,
the government would not be able to constitutionally impose any
mandatory requirements upon cable system operators.' 52 However, like
the Home Box Office court which preceded it, the Quincy court was un-
willing to accept the idea that no regulation of cable television would be
valid."5 3 Instead, the court opted to use the O'Brien interest balancing
test, as applied to cable television in Home Box Office, as the minimum
standard of first amendment scrutiny.
In adopting the O'Brien/Home Box Office balancing test, the Quincy
court required that, as a minimum, the must carry rules clear three hur-
dles in order to be constitutionally permissible. The rules were to be
content neutral and only burden speech "incidentally," serve an impor-
tant or substantial government interest, and be narrowly drafted to im-
pose a restriction "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest."' 54 Under the court's analysis, if the must carry rules failed to
clear any one of the three threshold O'Brien requirements, they could not
stand. With this in mind, the Quincy court suggested that the must carry
rules may impose a more than incidental burden upon speech,' 55 proba-
bly are unnecessary and therefore do not serve a substantial government
interest,'56 and definitely are not narrowly drafted to sufficiently serve
their intended purpose. 5 7 Because the rules obviously failed to clear the
last hurdle and could be held unconstitutional on that ground alone,
there was no need for the court to make any absolute findings about the
O'Brien test's first two requirements. By finding the rules overbroad, the
court avoided the possibility of developing a more precise test.
Although the court determined that the old must carry rules were
unconstitutional under the O'Brien/Home Box Office analysis, it was
careful to point out that it was not deciding whether any version of
149. Under the Miami Herald standard, a government imposed right of access to the tradi-
tional press violates the first amendment. Id. at 258.
150. 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
151. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1463.
152. Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 258; see supra note 149.
153. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1450. "That cable television shares attributes of the more tradi-
tional press does not, of course, suggest that the First Amendment interposes an impermeable
bulwark against any regulation." Id.
154. 768 F.2d at 1451.
155. Id. at 1451-54.
156. Id. at 1457; see supra text accompanying note 117.
157. 768 F.2d at 1459; see supra text accompanying notes 124-27.
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mandatory carriage rules would violate the first amendment.15 8 There-
fore, there exists a possibility that cable carriage rules narrowly tailored
and necessary to serve a substantial government interest may be upheld
as constitutionally valid even if they do abridge speech to a certain
extent.
B. Applying the O'Brien/Home Box Office Analysis
1. Assessing the degree of burden the must carry rules imposed
In addressing the first element of the O'Brien/Home Box Office
analysis, the Quincy court was reluctant to treat the must carry rules as
only an incidental burden upon speech. The rules operated to restrict the
editorial discretion of cable operators and the availability of channels for
programmers' services, while enhancing the expression of local broad-
casters.15 9 Because the burden on speech was dependent upon two varia-
ble factors, the number of local and significantly viewed signals in the
community and the channel capacity of the cable system, the court had
difficulty identifying the degree of burden the rules actually imposed. In
some instances-saturated cable systems providing the classic illustra-
tion-the must carry rules imposed a substantial burden upon both oper-
ators and programmers.
1 60
Had the court been so inclined, it simply could have declared that
since the rules clearly favored the speech of local broadcasters over that
of cable operators, programmers and distant broadcasters, they fell
outside the realm of "incidental burden" and therefore required the exist-
ence of a compelling governmental interest to be constitutionally valid. 161
The Quincy court avoided resolving this issue, however. Instead, the
court stated: "That the intrusion into cable operators' editorial auton-
omy is deep does not require the conclusion that the rules are inappropri-
ate for analysis under the O'Brien test." 162 By taking this approach, the
Quincy court left to a later court the task of determining whether a new
158. 768 F.2d at 1463.
159. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1451 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Stated Judge
Wright: "mhe Commission's objective is a far cry from the sort of interests that typically
have been viewed as imposing a merely 'incidental' burden on speech." Id.
160. The case of In re Quaker CATV, Inc., 59 F.C.C.2d 1216 (1976), provides a graphic
illustration of the saturation problem. Quaker's system had a 12 channel capacity and the
potential obligation to carry 17 stations pursuant to the must carry rules. For a discussion of
this case, see Saturated Cable Television Systems, supra note 11, at 713. Quaker provided a
rare instance where the cable system made a compelling showing and the FCC granted a
waiver of the must carry rules so as to allow the retention of a distant signal on the system
despite the demand for carriage by a local station. Id.
161. See supra text accompanying note 66.
162. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1453.
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version of the must carry rules, which do serve a legitimate governmental
interest, are constitutional because they meet the O'Brien criteria or are
still unconstitutional because they are purposely designed to favor certain
broadcasters over other broadcasters and all cablecasters.
2. Weighing the necessity of the must carry rules
In addressing the second element of the O'Brien/Home Box Office
test, that the rules serve an important or substantial government interest,
the Quincy court suggested that the Commission's stated interest in pre-
serving free, locally oriented television may not be sufficiently weighty to
warrant the rules' interference with first amendment rights. 63 However,
in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,"6 the United States Supreme Court
recently stated: "There can be little doubt that the comprehensive regu-
lations developed over the past twenty years by the FCC to govern signal
carriage by cable television systems reflect an important and substantial
federal interest."16 The Supreme Court then pointed out that "the
Commission has attempted to strike a balance between protecting non-
cable households from loss of regular television broadcasting service due
to competition from cable systems and ensuring that the substantial ben-
efits provided by cable of increased and diversified programming are se-
cured for the maximum number of viewers." '166
Thus, the Supreme Court recognized the existence of a legitimate
governmental interest in the area of cable television regulation. The
Quincy court, however, questioned the premise that cable actually poses
a threat to local broadcast television. 67 In effect, it held that there is no
need to strike a balance between cable and non-cable households if cable
poses no real threat. If there is no threat, there is no need for remedial
regulation.
The Quincy court used two approaches to dismiss the necessity of
the must carry rules, although neither of the approaches completely pre-
cludes the Commission from subsequently justifying the adoption of nar-
rower rules. The court first suggested that in the course of eliminating
other cable regulations, the Commission practically undermined the very
foundation of the must carry rules. 168 Second, the court stated that even
if that was not the case, the Commission did not meet its burden of justi-
163. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1454-55 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
164. 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984).
165. Id. at 2708.
166. Id.
167. 768 F.2d at 1455-56.
168. Id. at 1456.
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fication under Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC16 9 since it was unable to
affirmatively show that local broadcasters actually needed the protection
afforded by the rules.17
By broadly construing statements made by the FCC in its 1979 Eco-
nomic Inquiry Report, 7 ' such as "cable does not appear to be a major
negative force on the financial situations of television broadcasters,"'
172
the Quincy court found support for its assertion that the must carry rules
may no longer be necessary because local broadcasters no longer appear
to be in jeopardy. The FCC contended that underlying its conclusions in
the Economic Inquiry Report was the assumption that the must carry
rules would continue to operate. 173 The court discounted the FCC's ex-
planation by pointing out that the Commission had failed to expressly
state in its report that it was premising its conclusions on such an as-
sumption. 74 The court also noted that the FCC's conclusions "appeared
to rest largely on factors wholly unrelated to mandatory carriage. ' 175
Although the FCC made no express statements regarding the must
carry rules in its report, the Quincy court failed to consider other com-
ments by the Commission which indicate that the study did assume the
continued existence of mandatory carriage, at least in respect to UHF
band stations.1 76 For example, in summarizing its findings in the Eco-
nomic Inquiry Report, the Commission reported, "[t]he available infor-
mation ... indicates that presently UHF affiliates and independents in
intermixed markets, historically the least successful stations financially,
are often benefited by cable because the positive effect of signal parity on
cable more than offsets the negative effect of increased competition."'1
77
Although the FCC's assumption is not clearly expressed, the only way it
could be assured of UHF signal carriage, and hence signal parity on
169. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
170. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1457.
171. See supra note 119.
172. Economic Inquiry Report, supra note 119, at 688.
173. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1456.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. All broadcasting stations operate along an electromagnetic frequency established by
the FCC, on either very high frequency (VHF) or ultra high frequency (UHF). The VHF
range produces a higher quality signal than UHF, and therefore UHF reception is often infer-
ior to VHF reception. Cable television mitigates some of UHF's disadvantages because over
cable the reception quality of UHF signals is indistinguishable from VHF signals. See Malrite
T.V. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140, 1143 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982).
177. Economic Inquiry Report, supra note 119, at 661. The Commission also found that
"[t]he ability of stations to maintain existing levels of service to their communities is likely to
be unimpaired in the absence of our distant signal rules." Id. Had the Commission also found
the same to be true in the absence of its must carry rules, it would have expressly so indicated.
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cable, would be through the guarantee of mandatory carriage regula-
tions. The Quincy court seemed to ignore the subtleties of the Commis-
sion's analysis in order to read into the Commission's findings the fact
that the must carry rules were no longer necessary.
178
In an alternate approach, the Quincy court suggested that the must
carry rules did not effectively serve or further any governmental interest,
even if the interest they were designed to protect was still valid. 179 The
court reasoned that if the rules unnecessarily protected broadcasters
from unseen and unproven evils, they did not serve their articulated pur-
pose. The FCC had assumed that unless local stations were carried over
cable, cable television subscribers would cease watching local broadcast
television either because they would disconnect their antennas or because
the inconvenience of a switching device would deter them. The Commis-
sion also believed that the potential loss of a portion of local television
stations' audiences would adversely affect the stations' economic vital-
ity.18° The court criticized the FCC for neglecting to gather support for
the "assumptions that [were] the linchpins of its analysis." 8 ' The prob-
lem with the court's criticism is that prior to Quincy, mandatory carriage
requirements were always imposed upon cable television operators.
Therefore, there was never any opportunity for the Commission to
gather any empirical evidence as to what would result if there were no
such requirements. With the protection afforded by the must carry rules
local broadcasters were successfully coexisting with cable television serv-
ices and imported distant signals. Thus, the Commission had no reason
to believe the rules needed further verification or justification.
In balancing the government's interest against the petitioner's first
amendment rights, the Quincy court presented a detailed history of cable
regulation before it subjected the must carry rules to any constitutional
review. However, in its discussion of the origins and purposes of the
must carry rules, the court brought up two factors which it seemed to
ignore in its later analysis of whether the rules served their stated pur-
pose. Early in the opinion, the court pointed out that although broadcast
178. The Quincy court suggested only that VHF stations do not need the protection af-
forded by the must carry rules. It ignored the issue of the rules' necessity with regard to UHF
signals. The Commission, on the other hand, has expressly recognized that cable carriage
improves the financial situation of UHF signals. See, e.g., Cable Television Syndicated Pro-
gram Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663, 891 (1980) (separate statement of Chairman Ferris).
At the very least, the rules may still be needed to protect UHF stations. See infra text accom-
panying notes 185-87.
179. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1457.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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signals are still available off the air to cable subscribers if they purchase
an inexpensive A/B switch,182 the switch is only useful if the subscribers
keep their antennas connected. 8 3 The court noted that since cable can
deliver clear signals without the use of expensive or unsightly antennas,
subscribers often choose to disconnect their antennas. 184 The court did
not, however, emphasize the fact that when cable subscribers disconnect
their antennas the switching device becomes, in effect, useless.
Second, the court pointed out that even if the antenna remains in
place, cable retransmission of UHF signals is far clearer than if the same
signals were received by antenna.18 5  Thus, without the benefit of
mandatory carriage, all UHF stations face a significant competitive dis-
advantage compared not only to VHF stations but also to all cable serv-
ices.186 The must carry rules were adopted to balance the inequalities
and insure parity between the two modes of television communication. 187
Although it may not have made any difference in the final analysis, 188 the
court neglected to weigh the inherent advantages cable enjoys over
broadcasting when it applied the O'Brien/Home Box Office standard to
balance the government's interest against the petitioners' first amend-
ment rights.
3. Determining the scope of the must carry rules
The last requirement the Quincy court imposed upon the rules was
that they be narrowly drafted to protect only those stations which need
protection. 89 This hurdle proved to be insurmountable. The court
stated that "[u]ntil [the FCC] establishes a baseline for its general objec-
tive of preserving free, community-oriented television... we simply can-
not know whether the rules are adequately tailored to pass constitutional
muster."19 0 The court then described the rules as a "'fatally overbroad
response' to the perceived fear that cable will displace free, local televi-
sion. '  The court correctly pointed out that although the rules were
182. This switch enables cable subscribers to alternate between cable and off-the-air VHF
signals, and is available for about five dollars. Id. at 1441 & n.16.
183. Id. at 1441.
184. Id.
185. Id. See supra note 176 for a discussion of UHF broadcast signals.
186. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1441.
187. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
188. These two factors, standing alone, would probably be insufficient to justify the degree
of imposition the rules placed upon cable operators.
189. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
190. Id. at 1461.
191. Id. at 1459 (quoting FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 105 S. Ct.
1459, 1470 (1985)).
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adopted to preserve an optimal amount of local programming in every
community and to protect the economic well being of local broadcast
stations, they operated to require carriage of all local and significantly
viewed stations regardless of the stations' program format and financial
health. 192
The court appropriately focused on an apparent inconsistency in the
rules' application. In theory, the rules were designed to guard against
the demise of diverse, local broadcasting. Yet, in practice, they often
operated to require carriage of signals which, while of local origin, trans-
mitted little or no local programming. 193 Moreover, the overinclusive-
ness of the rules also contributed to the saturation phenomenon, causing
certain cable systems to face more must carry obligations than channels
available. 194 The Commission knew of the saturation problem prior to
Quincy Cable TV's and TBS's challenges of the must carry rules; in fact,
in 1977, the Commission even requested proposals and comments about
how the problem should be remedied. 195 However, each of the proposed
remedies considered by the FCC overlooked the most obvious solution-
narrowing the applicability of the rules to only those broadcast signals
which could show that they truly needed the protection. The FCC had
not taken further action on the saturation problem prior to the Quincy
decision. The Quincy court recognized that by offering blanket protec-
tion to all local broadcasters without considering the individual stations'
needs, the must carry rules were impermissibly overinclusive and placed
undue and unjustified burdens upon cable operators and programmers.
C. Impact of the Court's Holding
Interested parties may disagree with the Quincy court as to the de-
gree of burden the rules placed upon cable operators, the substantiality
or import of the government's interest in local broadcasting, and whether
the rules effectively served their purpose. It is evident, however, that the
must carry rules failed to pass constitutional muster on the basis of their
192. Id. at 1461.
193. Id.
194. See supra note 160 for an illustration of the saturation problem.
195. Saturated Cable Television Systems, supra note 11, at 710. The Commission presented
several proposals in the Saturated Cable Television Notice, each focusing upon different con-
siderations. The Commission first suggested a plan which offered lesser carriage rights to new
stations which come on the air after the cable system became operational. Id. Ironically, if
one steps back and digests this alternative, it seems to undermine the very purpose of the must
carry rules-protecting local broadcasting. New, unestablished local broadcast stations proba-
bly need cable carriage more than established stations. The Commission alternatively sug-
gested that carriage priority depend upon station location, program format or technical
considerations. Id. at 717-18.
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overbreadth alone, and thus were properly invalidated by the court.
Taken literally, the Quincy decision places first amendment protection of
cable television operators somewhere in between the protection afforded
television broadcasters' 96 and that afforded newspaper publishers and ed-
itors. 19 7 The court refrained from imposing upon cable television all of
the access and fairness requirements to which broadcasters are subject, 98
yet it refused to guarantee to cable the complete freedom that newspaper
editors and publishers enjoy.
In essence, the Quincy court turned the tables on the FCC and those
broadcasters who relied upon the must carry rules. Prior to the court's
decision, the burden fell upon the individual cable system to make a com-
pelling showing, with specific factual evidence, that a waiver of its must
carry obligations furthered the public interest.' 99 As a result of the
Quincy decision, the burden has shifted to the Commission to make an
affirmative finding, with specific factual evidence, that a mandatory car-
riage rule is necessary to further an important or substantial, perhaps
even compelling,2 "° government interest. Then, and only then, will the
courts uphold such a rule.
V. AFTERMATH OF THE QuiNcY DECISION
Describing the probable effects of the Quincy decision, two commen-
tators stated: "The ruling will have a major impact on cable system own-
ers, broadcast stations and competing services, and the ricocheting steps
the participants will take to adjust their behavior will have substantial
implications for the structure of the industry." 0' This statement high-
lights the fact that the Quincy decision cannot be analyzed in a vacuum.
The court's action, invalidating the must carry rules, was almost immedi-
ately followed by the broadcast groups' reaction: appealing the deci-
196. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
198. The Supreme Court has supported regulations which clearly abridge broadcasters'
speech. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the court upheld the
FCC's fairness doctrine, which requires broadcasters to provide adequate coverage of public
issues and ensures that the coverage accurately reflects the opposing views. See supra note 61.
See also 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982), which provides that if a broadcaster grants one legally quali-
fied candidate for public office access to the airwaves, it is obligated to grant all opposing
candidates the same right of access.
199. See, e.g., In re Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 89 F.C.C.2d 1128, 1136 (1982).
200. As discussed supra in the text accompanying note 161, a later court may determine
that the O'Brien/Home Box Office analysis is insufficient, and require the government to meet
a substantially heavier burden of justification.
201. Price & Nader, 'Must Carry': The End-Ways to Cope With Change, Nat'l L.J., Sept.
30, 1985, at 15, col. 1.
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sion,2 °2 petitioning the FCC for new must carry rules2" 3 and lobbying
Congress to change the related law which grants cable a compulsory
copyright license limiting the royalties cable pays for retransmitting local
broadcast programming.2"
It is not disputed that the must carry rules gave local broadcast sta-
tions an advantage over cable programmers. However, by invalidating
the rules the Quincy decision left the relationship between the cable and
broadcast industries in a state of complete disarray. Unless new
mandatory carriage rules are adopted or the copyright law is revised,
cable television now has a clear advantage over broadcast television. If
cable systems are no longer obligated to carry local stations at no charge,
they can charge for carriage and pick and choose among the local sta-
tions.20 ' Broadcasters recognize this fact and argue that it would be in-
equitable for cable systems to charge local broadcast stations for carriage
when the local broadcasters cannot directly charge the cable for copy-
right royalties. 206 Additionally, although some broadcast stations may
be in a financial position to bargain for carriage with cable operators,
other stations may not.
20 7
202. The FCC, the losing party in the Quincy decision, decided not to appeal the case,
believing the court's ruling legally sound. It was the broadcasters, intervenors in Quincy and
the real "losers" in the case, who appealed the decision and petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari. NAB Petition for Certiorari, supra note 137.
203. See infra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
204. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(c) (1982). While the Quincy court found no interrelation between
the must carry rules and the compulsory copyright license, broadcasters argue that such a
relationship exists. The NAB points out that when the court reached its conclusion that the
must carry rules favor broadcasters over cable programmers, it neglected to mention that the
copyright law does the same thing, only in reverse, because it confers a benefit upon cable
operators. NAB Petition for Certiorari, supra note 137, at 25.
Broadcasters must devote a substantial portion of their revenues to pay copyright royal-
ties on their programming. In the absence of any mandatory carriage requirement, cable oper-
ators have the benefit of no copyright liability on the local signals they choose to carry, without
the burden of being required to carry every local station. According to the Association of
Independent Television Stations President Preston Padden, the compulsory license then be-
comes "a device for cable operators to inteject themselves into the competition among local
broadcast stations by carrying some and excluding others" and would not be serving the pur-
pose Congress intended the license to serve. INTV Joins NAB in Compulsory License Fight,
BROADCASTING, July 29, 1985, at 26.
205. Soon after the must carry rules became ineffective, several local television stations were
notified that they would be dropped from carriage unless they agreed to pay the cable system
for carriage. See, e.g., Must-Carry Damage Case Study, BROADCASTING, Sept. 16, 1985, at 35.
206. See supra note 204.
207. Relying upon demographic trends and the high rate of return broadcasters earn on
their investments, the Commission reported in its Economic Inquiry Report that VHF licen-
sees do not suffer from competition by cable and, in fact, could anticipate a steady growth in
future station revenues. Economic Inquiry Report, supra note 119, at 661. Such a statement
suggests that VHF broadcasters, network, affiliate and independent stations, will be able to
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Shortly after the Quincy decision took effect and the rules were re-
scinded, the Association of Independent Television Stations (INTV), the
National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and public broadcasting in-
terest groups, such as the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB),2 °8
the National Association of Public Television Stations and the Public
Broadcasting Service (PBS),2 ° 9 each filed petitions for new must carry
rulemaking with the Commission. The FCC took note of these petitions
and released an official Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking2 10
soon thereafter. In its notice, the FCC sought comments on the propos-
als it had received and requested submission of additional specific must
carry proposals to fill the void left by the Quincy decision. 211
After weeks of negotiation, and just prior to the FCC's deadline for
submitting comments on the must carry issue, the commercial broadcast-
ing groups, NAB, INTV and the Television Operators Caucus (TOC),
reached a compromise on the must carry issue with the cable television
industry. 212 The two industries joined forces and on March 21, 1986
submitted the agreed-upon rules to the FCC for final approval. The
agreement addresses the main concerns of both industries, promoting the
carriage of local broadcast signals and minimizing the impingement upon
cablecasters' constitutional rights. Although cable had won in court and
was not required to accept any must carry plan, cable industry officials
were willing to compromise with broadcasters to avoid further attacks on
the compulsory copyright license or an all out war over the must carry
rules.213
VI. THE NEw MUST CARRY PROPOSALS
A. INTVs Original Proposal
Seeing a close tie between mandatory carriage requirements and
bargain at arms length with cable for carriage. On the other hand, noncommercial stations,
which do not have sufficient revenue, will be unable to afford paying for carriage on cable. See
infra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
208. CPB is a nonprofit, nongovernmental corporation created by Congress in 1967 to pro-
vide federal assistance to public radio and television. See infra note 227.
209. PBS is a private nonprofit membership corporation consisting of the licensees of non-
commercial, educational television stations throughout the country, which acquires and dis-
tributes national programming to its member stations. See FCC v. League of Women Voters,
104 S. Ct. 3106, 3112 n.5 (1984).
210. 50 Fed. Reg. 48,232 (Nov. 22, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking].
211. Id.
212. See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
213. Cable Goes Behind Closed Doors on Must Carry, BROADCASTING, Feb. 17, 1986, at 22-
23.
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cable television's compulsory copyright license for broadcast signals,2 14
INTV originally requested that the FCC adopt rules that would preclude
the benefit of a compulsory license to cable system operators unless the
cable system carried the entire signals of all local television stations on its
basic tier of service.21 INTV argued that since the proposed rules
neither require nor prohibit carriage of any television station on cable
systems, they raise no first amendment issue.216 Under this proposal, a
cable operator could either choose to take advantage of the compulsory
license and carry all the local signals or to negotiate separately with se-
lected stations for use of their copyrighted material.2 1 7
While the rules INTV originally proposed may not impose any
mandatory requirements upon cable operators, their constitutionality
may still be suspect. Although not wholeheartedly accepted by the
courts, the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" may present a chal-
lenge. This doctrine bars the government from conditioning the receipt
of benefits upon waiver of constitutional rights, even if the receipt of the
benefits is only a privilege and not a constitutional right.2"' Applying the
doctrine to INTV's proposal, it may not be permissible for the Commis-
sion to condition the benefit of the compulsory copyright license, which
substantially reduces the amount of cable operators' copyright liability,
upon the cable operators' waiver of first amendment freedoms.
Even if imposing such a choice is constitutionally valid, these pro-
posed rules still do not remedy the overbreadth problem of the old must
carry rules. Unless the definition of "local station" is revised to narrow
the applicability of the rule, the proposed rules would still encourage car-
riage of all of the local broadcast stations which were carried under the
old rules.219 A cable system would be coerced into carrying all local
broadcast stations regardless of the station's character or financial status
and the amount of programming duplicated by other stations. Thus,
214. See supra note 204.
215. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 210, at 48,233.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 510 (1978). For an application of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert,
the state of South Carolina denied unemployment benefits to appellant because she refused to
accept work on Saturdays for religious reasons. The Supreme Court found that appellant's
disqualification for benefits imposed a burden upon her right to practice the religion of her
choice. The Court held that a ruling which required her to either comply with her religious
practice and forfeit her unemployment benefits or abandon a precept of her religion in order to
accept work was not constitutionally permissible. Id.
219. INTV's proposal requires carriage of all local stations that were entitled to insist upon
mandatory carriage under the must carry rules as they were in effect on April 15, 1976; see 47
C.F.R. § 76.57-.61 (1976). See also Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 210, at 48,233.
June 1986] 1399
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:1369
INTV's original proposal merely rearranges communications and copy-
right laws to offer some benefit to local broadcasting, without identifying
which broadcasters are sufficiently at risk to warrant such a benefit.
B. The Public Broadcasters' Proposal
The public broadcasters, protecting their own interests apart from
the commercial broadcasters, requested that the Commission consider
rules which would require that cable systems carry, without charge and
on their basic tier of channels, all public stations that provide Grade B11'
service to the system's community.22 Public stations can distinguish
themselves from commercial stations because public television does not
operate for profit. Since public broadcasters can point to FCC and con-
gressional policies supporting the availability of diverse, quality public
television programming,"' and the fact that rules requiring carriage of
only public stations are much narrower than the old must carry rules,
public television broadcasters argue that their proposed rules pass consti-
tutional muster under the Quincy standard.22
The Quincy court held that the FCC could not convincingly show
that the must carry rules were needed to protect local broadcasters from
financial ruin.224 However, public broadcasters, in their Joint Petition
for Rule Making,225 present a convincing case that mandatory carriage is
necessary to keep local public television stations in operation. The public
broadcasters argue that the lack of a mandatory carriage requirement
will result in a loss of cable carriage of local public stations, and that
such a loss of carriage will undermine the financial health of the local
stations and adversely affect the overall quality and diversity of all public
television programming.226
The financial realities of noncommercial television lend support to
the public broadcasters' claim that local stations will not be carried over
cable in the absence of must carry regulations.227 Because cable televi-
220. The grade B contour is defined as an imaginary line along which a good quality broad-
cast picture may be expected 90% of the time at the best 50% locations. See Midwest Televi-
sion, Inc. v. FCC, 426 F.2d 1222, 1224 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
221. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 210, at 48,233.
222. For a codification of congressional policy, see 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1982).
223. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 210, at 48,233.
224. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1457 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
225. Joint Petition for Rule Making of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the Na-
tional Association of Public Television Stations and the Public Broadcasting Service (1985) (on
file in the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review office) [hereinafter cited as Public Broadcasters'
Petition].
226. Id. at 8.
227. A brief history of public television is in order here. In its Sixth Report and Order on
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sion is a commercial enterprise, system operators, when given the oppor-
tunity, will charge local stations for carriage on the system. Only those
broadcasters which meet the operator's price will be guaranteed a chan-
nel on the community system. Public television stations are simply not
structured to afford any carriage fees. 2 ' Unlike their commercial coun-
terparts, public stations are financed through federal funding, grants and
viewer contributions, not advertising revenues. 229 According to one pub-
lic broadcaster, public television is "the only system of broadcasting in
the world established with no visible means of support. . .. [l]t has
known almost continual poverty .... ,"230 As the law stands today, pub-
lic broadcasters are prohibited from selling advertising time or actively
promoting any product or service of any company or organization. 3 I
All of a public station's revenue is used to help produce or acquire pro-
gramming or to operate the station.2 32  Therefore, unless the law and
Television Assignments, 41 F.C.C. 148 (1952), the FCC reserved approximately 12% of the
initial television allocations, or 242 channels, for a separate class of license: noncommercial
educational stations. In 1962, Congress passed the Educational Television Facilities Act, Pub.
L. No. 87-447, 76 Stat. 64 (1962), which provided funds to assist local communities in con-
structing new public television stations. After a comprehensive study of the nation's system of
educational broadcasting, the Carnegie Commission on Educational Television reported on
what the goals of the system should be, how many stations were needed to service the nation,
what the cost would be and how the system should be funded. PUBLIC TELEVISION, A PRO-
GRAM FOR ACTION: THE REPORT OF THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON EDUCATIONAL TELE-
VISION (1967) [hereinafter cited as CARNEGIE COMM'N REPORT]. Shortly after the
Commission's report, the word "educational" was replaced with "public," and Congress
passed the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (1967) (codified
as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1982)). The Act authorized additional funding and estab-
lished the nonprofit Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) to facilitate the development
of public broadcasting, assist in the establishment and development of a national interconnect-
ing system and administer the funds Congress had dedicated to public broadcasting. C.
BROWN, T. BROWN & W. RIVERS, THE MEDIA AND THE PEOPLE 128-29 (1978).
228. Public Broadcasters' Petition, supra note 225, at 11.
229. For example, KCET, a Los Angeles area public station and member of PBS, received,
for the 1985 fiscal year, 68% of its total revenue from individual subscriptions, corporation
and foundation grants and donated goods and services. An additional 24% came from pro-
gram production and broadcasting grants and a CPB community service grant. DIAL, Jan.
1986, at 11 (KCET's monthly program guide).
230. Breitenfield, Heart of the System: The Stations, in THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC BROAD-
CASTING 39 (Cater & Nyhan eds. 1976).
231. 47 U.S.C. § 399B(b)(2) (1982) clearly prohibits public stations from "mak[ing] its fa-
cilities available ... for the broadcasting of any advertisement" in exchange for any remunera-
tion. In order to generate private support for public broadcasting, public stations are
authorized to acknowledge donors and program underwriters. The rules concerning commer-
cial credit are very explicit and restrictive, however. A public station may identify but must
avoid promoting its sponsors. See Educational Broadcasting Stations, 97 F.C.C.2d 255, 265
(1984). See also generally 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 399A-399B (West Supp. 1985).
232. For the fiscal year 1985, Los Angeles station KCET spent 63% of its revenue on pro-
duction, programming and broadcasting, 18% on fundraising and the remaining 19% on pub-
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financial structure of public television are revised, local public stations
will not be carried over cable unless the system operators are obligated to
carry the stations for little or no charge.2 33 In any event, it seems almost
contradictory to require that public stations-generally owned and oper-
ated by local groups, government organizations or educational institu-
tions to serve community needs23 4-- pay private cable operators in order
to be readily accessible to the public.
In the Commission's view, "the widest possible dissemination of ed-
ucational and public television programming is clearly of public benefit
and should not be restricted."2 35 If it takes no action to adopt new must
carry rules which protect public television, the Commission would be
indirectly precluding public television from cable carriage and therefore
acting in a manner inconsistent with its stated policy. Because almost all
public stations depend upon viewer contributions, any audience loss that
a station suffers due to lack of cable carriage will result in a reduction in
contributions and, in turn, federal funding.236 Moreover, loss of cable
carriage of individual stations will also adversely affect the quality of
public television programming in general.2 37  Public broadcasters con-
clude that a regulation requiring carriage of local public stations on the
community cable system would eliminate the risks to individual stations
and overall programming quality that complete cable carriage deregula-
lic information and administration expenses. DIAL, Jan. 1986, at 11 (KCET's monthly
program guide).
233. Public Broadcasters' Petition, supra note 225, at 11.
234. The Carnegie Commission named four distinct categories of noncommercial broadcast
stations: School stations, licensed to school systems or districts; state stations, licensed to state
boards of education or similar state agencies; university stations, licensed to public colleges
and universities; and community stations, licensed to nonprofit groups or corporations. CAR-
NEGIE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 227, at 21-22. The public stations most likely to need
mandatory carriage by cable systems in order to reach their maximum audience are the com-
munity stations since they generally carry programming for the benefit of the community at
large.
235. Cable Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 180 (1972). Since the Commission
adopted its Sixth Report and Order on Television Assignments, 41 F.C.C. 148 (1952), both
Congress and the FCC have promoted the growth of a public television system in which auton-
omous local stations provide diverse, quality programming to their respective communities.
According to Congress, "it furthers the general welfare to encourage public telecommunica-
tions servies ... responsive to the interests of people both in particular localities and through-
out the United States." 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(5) (1982).
236. A decline in viewer contributions will affect the amount of funding a station receives
from CPB. 47 U.S.C. § 396(k)(6)(B) (1982).
237. Public Broadcasters' Petition, supra note 225, at 10. Due to the interrelationship be-
tween public stations and public program producers, both station operations and programming
will be affected. Public television producers rely upon financial support from the individual
stations to fund their production expenses. Therefore, a reduction in station income translates
into less money for quality program production. Id.
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tion would encourage."'
The rules proposed by the public broadcasters are narrowly drawn
and impose less of a burden on speech than the invalidated version of the
must carry rules. In some respects, the rules may even be underinclusive,
since they only protect noncommercial stations. 239 The proposed rules
obligate cable operators to carry only the community's noncommercial
stations which request carriage.24° Since many communities have only
one public station in operation, the rules would impose only a minimal
burden.241 In the larger television markets where there is more than one
public station, the stations are generally licensed to different entities
which provide different types of programming and serve different audi-
ences.242 Even in the rare situation where stations in the same commu-
nity duplicate some programming, the programs generally air at different
times.243 Moreover, the public broadcasters' rule would not require a
cable system to carry any public station which simultaneously broadcasts
all of the same programming as another public station already carried by
the system.24
Since most modern cable systems can or will have the capacity to
carry upwards of fifty channels on a single cable,245 imposing mandatory
carriage of one, two or three signals hardly seems to place "substantial
limitations... on the cable operator's otherwise broad discretion."246 If
anything, the public broadcasters' proposal poses an incidental burden,
not a substantial one. Because the federal government has clearly ex-
238. Id.
239. Since the public broadcasters' proposed rules offer protection only to noncommercial
stations, any commercial station which is adversely affected by loss of cable carriage would not
benefit from such a law.
240. Public Broadcasters' Petition, supra note 225, at 1.
241. Id. at 13.
242. Id. at 14.
243. Id. Arguably, giving the public the opportunity to view some of the same programs at
different times also has its benefits. See CARNEGIE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 227, at 51-52;
see also Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). In Sony,
the Court held that taping broadcast programs off-the-air with a video cassette recorder for
time shifting purposes, so that viewers could watch the programs at a time more convenient
than the program's actual air time, did not infringe upon the copyrights of the broadcast pro-
grams. Id. Obviously, it expands the public's access to freely broadcast television if selected
quality programs are aired at different times on different channels.
244. Public Broadcasters' Petition, supra note 225, at 14.
245. Improvements in cable technology have increased the channel capacity of single cable
systems from 12 channels in the 1960's to 54 channels today, and even more tomorrow. It is
likely that fiber optic technology will offer even more dramatic expansion in channel capacity
in the near future. CABLESPEECH, supra note 16, at 1, 3.
246. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The Quincy
court suggested that the old must carry rules may have imposed a substantial burden. Id.
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pressed its policy of encouraging the growth and development of public
broadcasting, public broadcasters have no trouble establishing that regu-
lations protecting local public stations serve an important and substantial
government interest. Finally, the proposed rules are narrowly tailored to
require carriage of those stations which need the protection.
C. The Cable-Broadcast Compromise 2 47
The compromise reached between the NAB, INTV, TOC and the
cable industry associations provides that cable systems with more than
twenty-seven activated channels will be required to devote twenty-five
percent of their channel space to qualified local stations, while cable sys-
tems with twenty or fewer activated channels will be exempt from any
must carry obligations.248 The joint agreement further provides that
cable systems with twenty-one to twenty-six channels in use will be re-
quired to carry no more than seven local broadcast stations.2 49 If more
than seven stations are available to a cable system in this category, the
system's operator may choose which seven stations to carry.250 As with
the old rules, cable system operators will still be required to carry all
qualified stations in their entirety on the system's basic tier of service,
although not necessarily on their channel positions.251
To qualify for must carry eligibility under the agreement's proposed
rules, broadcast stations must be within fifty miles of the cable system's
principal receiving station and must receive a minimum established view-
ing share.2 52 New stations must demonstrate that they meet the estab-
247. Submission of Joint Industry Agreement to the FCC, In re Amendment of Part 76 of
the Commission's Rules Concerning Carriage of Television Broadcast Signals by Cable
Television Systems (Mar. 1986) [hereinafter cited as Joint Industry Agreement]. The specifics
of the rules proposed by the joint industry compromise were also reported in the following
articles: The Deal is Done on Must Carry, BROADCASTING, Mar. 3, 1986 at 31-34; Cable Firms
OK Pact on Local Broadcasts, L.A. Times, Feb. 28, 1986, pt. IV, at 1, col. 1; Must Carry:
Cable, Broadcasting Reach Tentative Pact, Hollywood Rptr., Feb. 28, 1986, at 1, col. 1. The
rules proposed by this agreement are a diluted version of the rule proposed earlier by the NAB
and INTV. NAB originally requested that cable systems be required to devote 40% of their
channels to local broadcasting, and carry all new local stations regardless of viewership shares
for the first two years of continuous on-air operation. For a detailed discussion of the
proposals submitted prior to the cable-broadcast agreement, see Countdown on Must Carry,
BROADCASTING, Feb. 3, 1986, at 19-24.
248. Joint Industry Agreement, supra note 247, at 26. Nearly one third of all operating
cable systems carry 20 or fewer channels and will therefore be exempt from the proposed
regulation. The Deal is Done on Must Carry, supra note 247, at 31.
249. Joint Industry Agreement, supra note 247, at 6-7.
250. Id. at 7.
251. Id. at 10.
252. Id. at 2-5. Stations must receive a two percent viewing share and a five percent net
weekly circulation in non-cable homes by county to be eligible under the proposed rules. Id. at
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lished viewing standard before they seek must carry eligibility.253 The
proposed rules provide that cable systems will not be required to carry
more than one qualified local network affiliate station of the same com-
mercial or public network if more than one qualifies.254 However, con-
trary to the FCC's current nonduplication rules,255 under the joint
agreement a cable system that does choose to carry more than one station
affiliated with the same network will not be required to afford nondupli-
cation protection. 6
The agreement also provides that cable operators cannot charge
broadcasters for carriage of a non-distant signal covered by the compul-
sory license.257 A station that qualified or would have qualified for car-
riage under the old must carry rules, but will not qualify under the
proposed plan will be afforded "may carry" status.258 If a cable system
operator chooses to carry a may carry station's signal it must do so at no
charge to the station.259 Finally, the compromise includes a promise
from broadcasters that they will not ask Congress to repeal cable's com-
pulsory license.26°
In reaching the agreement, both sides had to make concessions and
neither was completely satisfied; however, the broadcast groups felt it
was the best that could be accomplished considering the constraints of
the Quincy decision.26' Although the commercial broadcasters and
cablecasters have reached an accord that addresses all of the private in-
terests-the political and practical concerns of the must carry rules-it
will be up to the Commission, or perhaps ultimately the court, to deter-
mine whether the proposed rules are constitutional and best serve the
needs of the public.
4-5. These eligibility requirements are different from the old rules, which based must carry
eligibility upon proximity-35 miles or the Grade B contour, or by being significantly viewed.
See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
253. Joint Industry Agreement, supra note 247, at 5-6.
254. Id. at 6-7. The proposed rules also provide that cable systems are not required to carry
teletext, multichannel sound or any signals carried in the vertical blanking interval. Id. at 10.
255. See supra note 31 for a discussion of the nonduplication rules.
256. Joint Industry Agreement, supra note 247, at 8.
257. Id. at 9. Broadcast signals which are covered under cable's compulsory license are
those that were considered must carry signals under the FCC regulations in effect on April 15,
1976. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(e) (1982).
258. Joint Industry Agreement, supra note 247, at 9.
259. Id. at 10.
260. The Deal is Done on Must Carry, supra note 247, at 31, 32.
261. Under the Quincy standard, any new must carry rules must further a substantial gov-
ernment interest and be narrowly tailored so as to impose only a minimal burden upon cable
operators' editorial discretion. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1454 (D.C. Cir.
1985). See supra text accompanying note 114.
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Although the rules proposed by the joint agreement are narrower in
scope and applicability than the old rules, they still suffer from many of
the same shortcomings when analyzed under Quincy's standard of consti-
tutionality. First, cable operators have agreed to give up some editorial
freedom and devote twenty-five percent of their operational channels to
local broadcast stations, but that is no guarantee that such a requirement
is a permissible impingement upon the operators' first amendment rights.
It will be up to the court to determine whether such an imposition is
merely incidental or unconstitutionally substantial. Granted, these pro-
posed rules give cable operators the opportunity to choose among must
carry signals in situations where there exists an overabundance of sta-
tions which qualify for carriage. From the perspective of cable operators
and programmers, however, the rules still operate to preclude carriage of
any other signals or services on the seven or more channels reserved for
local broadcasting and, therefore, do intrude upon the operators' edito-
rial autonomy.
Second, to come within the Quincy standard of constitutionality, the
broadcast groups supporting this proposal must not only show that the
government's interest in preserving local broadcasting justifies an inter-
ference with first amendment freedoms, but also that the proposed rules
are necessary to further that goal. The Quincy court noted that in analo-
gous contexts the FCC generally demands hard evidence before it will
"'impose regulatory constraints and burdens on one industry or technol-
ogy in favor of another.' "262 Since the court will also demand a showing
that the must carry rules effectively serve their stated purpose in order to
uphold their constitutionality, the burden of justifying the necessity of
rules which protect certain eligible local broadcast signals now rests with
the broadcast groups. They will need to show that the absence of must
carry protection is causing substantial financial injury to local broadcast-
ers, and that the injury is frustrating the public's interest in free, commu-
nity oriented television.263 Given the Quincy court's adversity to the
suggestion that the must carry rules were necessary to protect VHF
licensees against competition from cable,21 this is perhaps the most diffi-
262. 768 F.2d at 1458 (quoting Economic Inquiry Report, supra note 119, at 949 (concur-
ring statement of Commissioner Fogarty)). FCC Chairman Mark Fowler has indicated since
the Quincy decision that he disfavors must carry regulation. Fowler Takes First Amendment
Hard Line on Must Carry, BROADCASTING, Mar. 3, 1986, at 32. Therefore, it seems reason-
able to assume that the Commission will require that the broadcasters present hard evidence
justifying the necessity of any new must carry rules before adopting any proposal.
263. The public broadcasters can make a much more compelling argument on this point
than the commercial broadcasters. See supra notes 226-38 and accompanying text.
264. 768 F.2d at 1456; see also supra note 207.
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cult challenge facing the commercial broadcasters who desire the adop-
tion of new must carry rules.
Although it may be administratively impossible to develop or apply
such a rule, the Quincy court indicated that in order to further their goal
the ideal must carry rules should identify and protect only those stations
which are significantly at risk.265 The stations most needy of must carry
protection are new stations, small independent stations, religious, and
public stations. Clearly, the cable and broadcast groups' proposed rules
do not make such an identification nor do they protect only those sta-
tions at risk. In fact, the commercial broadcasters' proposed rules may
end up favoring the wealthier stations at the expense of poorer or less
stable stations. For this reason the public broadcasters are far from satis-
fied with this proposal.266 Under the old rules, cable systems were ex-
pressly obligated to carry noncommercial stations along with all the local
commercial and significantly viewed signals.26 7 Since the new rules
would, in some instances, give the system operators a choice among the
must carry stations, public broadcasters fear that cable operators will opt
to carry the more popular commercial stations over the less widely
viewed public stations. 268 This proposal would further frustrate the in-
terests of public broadcasting, contrary to stated governmental policy.
2 69
The Quincy court distinguished between rules which favor local
broadcasters and those which favor local broadcasting. 27 ° While the lat-
ter would be constitutional if justified by the governmental interest of
preserving localism, the former would be impermissible for any rea-
son.271 The rules proposed by the joint agreement, which exclude from
mandatory carriage eligibility new and unestablished local stations and
give cable operators the opportunity to choose among eligible signals,
may unconstitutionally favor certain local broadcasters, without protect-
ing local broadcasting.272
265. 768 F.2d at 1463.
266. The Deal is Done on Must Carry, supra note 247, at 31, 33.
267. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
268. Some small market independent stations share this same fear, and along with public
and religious broadcasters have submitted comments to the FCC expressing discontent with
the proposed accord. See Must Carry: Island of Dissidence in a Sea of Assent, BROADCAST-
ING, Mar. 10, 1986, at 37-39.
269. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
270. 768 F.2d at 1460.
271. Id. "[Mere the individual broadcasters themselves the object of the Commission's fa-
vors, the objective itself would be fundamentally illegitimate." Id.
272. Critics of the Joint Industry Agreement have noted this problem. Grace Cathedral,
Inc., currently in the process of buying a newly constructed UHF signal in Akron, Ohio,
asserts that "'[t]he compromise represents an insidious and cynical attempt by entrenched
economic interests to preserve their market power by conspiring to erect significant barriers to
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Lastly, under the O'Brien/Home Box Office/Quincy line of reason-
ing, the proposed must carry rules must be narrowly tailored to the evil
sought to be corrected.273 Unlike the old rules, the proposed rules do
eliminate the possibility that a cable system will be saturated with must
carry obligations (since they limit the imposition to twenty-five percent
of channels in use), and do take into account the degree of program du-
plication on the system. However, like the old rules, there is still some
question as to whether the means of the proposed rules adequately coin-
cide with their supposed objective. Assuming the evil sought to be cor-
rected is the demise of free, community oriented television, it is the new,
unestablished broadcast stations which are probably the most needy of
cable carriage since they need the exposure to establish a viewing audi-
ence. Yet, under the proposed rules these stations will not be eligible for
must carry status until they meet the required viewer share without the
benefit of mandatory cable carriage.
In contrast, stations that do have an established audience and easily
qualify for must carry status may not even need the free, guaranteed car-
riage to remain in business. The proposed rules continue to violate the
Quincy court's guidelines because once a station has met the proximity
and viewership requirements, it will be eligible for carriage "regardless of
whether or to what degree the affected cable system poses a threat to its
economic well-being."27 4 The proposed rules are overprotective with re-
gard to established stations and underinclusive with regard to new, small
market and public stations. These rules are therefore insufficiently tai-
lored to meet the end of protecting local broadcasting.
D. A Summary of the Must Carry Proposals
INTV's original proposal, practically superseded by the joint indus-
try agreement, merely placed a band-aid over the must carry issue; it did
not address the concerns identified by the Quincy court. The Quincy
court stated: "At some point the goal of preserving localism becomes
undifferentiated protectionism." '275 INTV's proposed rules appear to
pass that point and therefore fail under the court's set standard.
Similarly, the rules proposed by the joint industry compromise do
entry to new broadcast competition, and to deprive viewers, especially those who are not cable
television subscribers, of additional diversity.'" FCC Sets April 25 Deadline for Must-Carry
Comments, BROADCASTING, Mar. 31, 1986, at 73 (quoting comment of Grace Cathedral,
Inc.).
273. 758 F.2d at 1459.
274. Id. at 1461. The Quincy court stated that the old must carry rules were overinclusive
for this very reason.
275. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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not meet the constitutional standard imposed by Quincy. These rules
impose a recognizable burden upon cable operators' editorial autonomy
without establishing a sufficient countervailing governmental interest or
public policy rationale to justify the intrusion. Moreover, the rules are
not designed to protect those stations which need protection in order to
successfully compete with cable, and therefore do not further their as-
serted goal. The stations that would most likely be excluded from car-
riage under the joint agreement are those most likely to need the
guaranteed carriage.
Although it offers no protection to small commercial broadcasters,
the public broadcasters' proposal meets the constitutional minimum im-
posed by the Quincy court. These rules impose only a slight burden,
serve a substantial government interest-protecting public television sta-
tions and programming-and are narrowly drawn to serve that end. The
United States Supreme Court recently stated that "regulations that bur-
den speech incidentally ... must be evaluated in terms of their general
effect."2 76 The rules proposed by the public broadcasters will have the
effect of preserving our country's system of public broadcasting and en-
couraging a strong network of local stations responsive to the needs of
their local audiences. Conversely, the rules proposed by the joint indus-
try agreement, which tend to favor commercial stations, would have an
adverse effect upon public broadcast programming and service.
The INTV and joint industry proposals address the concerns of
commercial television broadcasters; however, it is whether the proposed
rules serve the public interest that is of greatest concern to the Commis-
sion, and whether the rules are constitutional that is of greatest concern
to the court. It must be remembered that the must carry rules were
designed to benefit the public interest, not private industry. Of the three
proposals discussed above, only the public broadcasters' proposal clearly
comes within the Quincy court's constitutional model and adequately
serves the specific governmental interest of preserving diverse, local
broadcasting.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC,2 77 the court determined that the
must carry rules, which required cable operators to carry all local televi-
sion signals as part of their basic service, were grossly overbroad and
failed to pass constitutional scrutiny under the test developed eight years
276. United States v. Albertini, 105 S. Ct. 2897, 2907 (1985).
277. 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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earlier in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC.2 78 The Quincy court also found
that the Commission was unable to justify the necessity of rules which
protected all local broadcasters. In applying the Home Box Office inter-
est balancing standard, the court avoided the difficult, yet potentially
necessary task of developing a more precise test for analyzing the consti-
tutionality of FCC regulations which impinge upon the editorial discre-
tion of cable system operators.
By invalidating the rules, the court expressly stated that it was not
suggesting that any version of must carry rules would violate the first
amendment; it only held that the version under analysis had failed the
test. Accordingly, in the wake of the old must carry rules' death, broad-
cast interest groups almost immediately petitioned the FCC to adopt an
alternate mandatory carriage plan. Should the Commission choose to
promulgate new, narrower must carry rules, it must carefully balance the
public's interest in local television service against the first amendment
rights of the cablecasters. If the Commission accepts the Quincy court's
holding that an important or substantial government interest justifies an
incidental intrusion into cable operators' editorial autonomy, then it
should adopt the rules proposed by the public broadcasters which serve
the interest of preserving community-oriented public television. 9
Alison K. Greene
278. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
279. If the FCC does adopt the public broadcasters' proposal, in fairness to the commercial
broadcasters, it should also urge Congress to revise the compulsory copyright license provi-
sions to account for the broadcasters' loss of guaranteed carriage. See supra notes 204-06 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the compulsory license.
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